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 ABSTRACT 
 
Multi-agent systems are now being considered a prom ising 
architectural approach for building Internet-based applications. 
One of the m ost critical and im portant as pects of s oftware 
deployed on the web has always been the security  of their 
architectures. However, des pite cons iderable work in s oftware 
architecture during the las t decade, few res earch efforts  have 
aimed at truly  defining language s for designing and formalizing 
agent architectures and m ore specifically secure ones. This paper 
identifies the foundations for an architectural description language 
(ADL) to specify secure multi-agent systems.  We propose a set 
of system design primitives and conceptualize it with the Z 
specification language to capture a "core" architectural model to 
build secure MAS architectures. We apply  it on an e-com merce 
example to illustrate our proposal.   
Keywords 
Architectural Description Languages, Security, Multiagent 
Systems 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The rise of the Internet and World-Wide-Web technologies has 
resulted in a greater and wider use of information systems not 
only by  major corporations and governments but also from 
individual users. Due to this wide  usage, many of thes e systems 
manage and store information that is considered sensitive, such as 
medical, financial and private data. With the introduction of such 
information to software sy stems, and all the advantages that this  
might introduce (s uch as  eas y acces s and s hare); the need to 
secure systems that contain such information becomes a necessity 
rather than an option. Imagine, for instance, the effects of medical 
records of individuals becoming widely available. 
 
 
 
However, securing s uch s ystems is  not an eas y tas k. This  
argument is supported by  research [1, 2]  as well as by various 
surveys (see for example www. cert.org) regarding the security  of 
current information systems. This is m ainly due to the 
requirements [2, 3]  and challenges [1, 2]  imposed when 
considering security  in the deve lopment of information sy stems. 
Not surprisingly, this has been identified [1,2,3,4]  and researchers 
are looking for new software development paradigms that cope 
with such requirements and provide answers to the security  
challenges.  
 
 One promising source of ideas for deploying Internet and web
based  applications is the area of multiagent system architectures.
They appear to be more flexible, modular and robus
traditional; including object-oriented ones. They tend to be open
and dynamic in the sense they exist in a changing organizational
and operational environment where new components can be
added, modified or removed at any time. Moreover, the
integration of security issues within an agent system context will
require for the agents of the system to consider the security
requirements, when specifying their objectives and interactions,
and therefore cause the propagation of security requirements to
the whole system.
 
However, such architectures introduce a degree of complexity.
To cope with this ever-increasing complexity of the design, it has
been recognized the value of making explicit architectural
descriptions [5]. To help developers with such descriptions,
architectural descriptions languages and architectural styles are
employed. An architectural description language (ADL) provides
a formal syntax and semantics for specifying architectural
abstractions in a descriptive notation. Unfortunately, despite 
considerable work in defining languages for architectural design
(see e.g., [5,6,7]) few research efforts have aimed at truly defining
languages for agent architectural design and even these do 
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adequate include security . This paper deals with this issue in 
defining a "core" set of structural, behavioural and security 
concepts, including relationships and constraints that are 
fundamental to propose an agent architectural description 
language. The language, called SKwyRL-ADL, includes an agent, 
a s ecurity and an architectural m odel and aim s at describing 
secure multi-agent systems, more specifically  those based on the 
BDI (belief-desire-intention) model.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
introduces the m ain concepts of SKwyRL-ADL including the 
security aspects. Section 3 des cribes our agent oriented approach 
on an e-com merce s ystem s ecure architectural s pecification. 
Section 4 pres ents the im plementation of the sy stem and finally  
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. SECURE SKwyRL ADL  
The SKwy RL (Socio-Intentional Ar Chitecture for Kno wledge 
Systems & Requirements ELicitation – http://www.isys.ucl.ac.be/ 
skwyrl) project proposes an agent ADL called SKwyRL-ADL [8] 
that offers a set of concepts , based on the Belief-Desire-Intention 
(BDI) agent model to form ally s pecify s ecure agent-oriented 
architectures. SKwyRL-ADL is com pliant with m ost of the 
classical ADLs proposed on the software architecture [6]  and 
security literature [9,10,11] . Fi gure 1 provides a description of 
these concepts together with their relationships.  
SKwyRL-ADL is  com posed of three sub-models: the agent 
model, the security model and the architectural m odel. The Z 
specification language [12] is used to formally describe SKwyRL-
ADL concepts. Z is  widely  us ed as  a form al s pecification 
language in the field of software architecture community and has 
been shown to be clear, concis e and relatively  easy to learn. Due 
to lack of space, we only detail and formalize some aspects of our 
ADL. We refer the reader to [Fau04]  for a more complete 
formalization. 
2.1 The agent Model 
The agent m odel captures the s tates of an agent and its potential 
behaviour. The agent needs knowledge about the environment in 
order to reach decis ions. Knowledge is  contained in agents in the 
form of one of many  knowledge  bases. A Knowledge base 
consists of a set of beliefs that the agent has about the 
environment and a set of goals that it pursues. 
Beliefs describe the environm ent of the agent in terms of states 
of objects with individual identitie s and properties, and relations 
on objects as being either true or false. We use predicate symbols 
to specify a particular relation that holds (or fails to hold) between 
several objects, and terms to represent objects. Each term  can be 
build from constant, variable or function symbols. From the above 
primitives, we can define an AtomicBelief. The set of all 
predicate, function, constant and variable symbols are denoted by 
[PredSymb], [Function], [Constant], and [Variable], respectively.  
 
[PredSymb],  [Function],  [Constant],  [Variable] 
[Terms]:=  Function(Term,…) | Constant | Variable 
AtomicBelief 
head: PredSymb 
terms: seq Term 
head ≠ ∅  ∧  terms ≠ ∅    
 
A Belief is specified either as  an AtomicBelief, a negated 
AtomicBelief, a s eries of AtomicBeliefs connected using logic 
connectives, or an AtomicBelief characterized with a tem poral 
pattern. The following tem poral patterns are used in SKwyRL-
ADL: ○ (in the next state), ● (in the previous  state), ◊ (some time 
in the future), ♦ (some time in the past), □ (always in the future), 
■ (alway s in the past),  W (alway s in the future unless), and  U 
(always in the future until). 
[Belief]:=    AtomicBelief    
  |  ¬AtomicBelief  
   | AtomicBelief  Connective AtomicBelief 
 | Temp_Pattern AtomicBelief                                                                      
 
 
 With    Connective  →   ∧  |  ∨  |  ⇒ 
            [Temporal_Pattern]:= ○ | ● | ◊ | ♦ | □ | ■ | W | U 
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Figure 1: Secure SKwyRL ADL Meta Model 
A goal is a set of objects that desc ribe an environment state that 
an agent wants to bring about. We consider goals according to 
four patterns: 
Achieve:   P ⇒ ◊ Q   (Q holds in current or some future state)  
Cease:     P ⇒ ◊ ¬Q 
Maintain:  P ⇒  □ Q   (Q holds in current and all future states) 
Avoid:    P ⇒ □ ¬Q 
With respect to beliefs, goals can be specified as follows:  
[GoalPattern] :=  Achieve | Cease |  Maintain | Avoid 
Goal 
head: GoalPattern 
state: ˜ Belief 
head ≠ ∅  ∧  state ≠ ∅    
The goal patterns influence the set of possible agent behaviors: 
achieve and ceas e goals  generate actions , plans, or events, while 
maintain and avoid goals restrict  them. When a goal is required, 
the agent identifies a set of plans to achieve or m aintain this goal. 
From then on, the agent chooses according to its current beliefs 
which of these plans will be executed.  
A plan defines the sequence of actions to be chosen by the agent 
to accomplish a task or achieve a goal. Actions  are bas ic 
executable commands of agent behaviour. P lans are s elected by  
agents. Selected plans constrain the agent’s  behaviour and act as 
intention. Intentions represent the deliberative states of the agent, 
i.e., which plans  the agent has  chos en for pos sible execution. A 
plan consists of: 
- An invocation condition detailing the circumstances, in terms 
of event, that cause the plan to be triggered;  
- An optional context that defines the preconditions of the plan, 
i.e., what must be believed by the agent for a plan to be selected 
for execution;  
- The plan body , that specifies either the sequence or formulae 
that the agent needs to perform; 
- An end-state that defines the postconditions under which the 
plan is succeeded; 
- And finally  a set of internal actions that specify  what happens 
when a plan fails or succeeds.  
A plan is specified as follows: 
[PlanName],  [AtomicPlan]:= Action | Service 
Plan 
name: PlanName 
Invocation: ˜ Invocation 
context: ˜ Belief 
body: seq  AtomicPlan 
endState: ˜ Belief 
succeed: seq  Atomicplan 
failure: seq  AtomicPlan 
name ≠  ∅  ∧  invocation ≠  ∅ ∧  body ≠  ∅ 
 
An event is som ething that happens in the sy stem that can be 
perceived, and it is either a goal (a new goal or the remove of a 
goal), a belief (a new belief or the remove of a belief) or a plan 
(the s uccess or failure of a plan). M AS are event-driven in the 
sense that agents start interacting by  initiating and perceiving 
events. In the abs ence of event an agent s its idle. W henever an 
event occurs, an agent initiates eith er a plan or a set of plans to 
response to that event. In this last case, the agent chooses between 
the plans it has available to achieve its goal. W e defined two 
types of events: (1) An internal ev ent that an agent posts to itself; 
and (2) An external event that an agent s ends to other agent or to 
its environment. 
According to the definition of event, both ty pes are specified 
considering the nature of the event, which can be a goal, a belief 
or a plan. The key difference between belief, plan or goal events 
is how an agent s elects plans  for execution. For belief and plan 
events, the agent selects the first applicable plan for that event and 
executes an instance of that plan only . The handling of goal event 
is more complex. An agent can as semble a s et of plans  for the 
goal event and apply  a sophisticated heuristic to choose the 
appropriate plans. However, for this  m atter, at the architectural 
design level where ADLs are defi ned, we rem ain com pletely 
independent from such heuristics,  considering that they  depend 
directly on the used programming environment.  
Finally an event is  generated either by  an action that m odifies 
beliefs or adds new goals, or by  services provided by  another 
agent. S ervices appear in the architectural m odel becaus e they  
involve interactions among agen ts that compose the MAS. 
Interactions serve as basic elements to support the construction of 
configurations. 
2.2 The Security Model 
With res pect to s ecurity, an agent has  zero or m ore protection 
objectives and each s ecurity objective im poses one ore more 
security cons traints on the agent. S ecurity cons traints m ight 
restrict the goals and/or the capabilities of an agent. On the other 
hand, an agent owns security mechanisms. A security mechanism 
represents a set of standard secu rity methods that an agent might 
have and they  help towards the satisfaction of the protection 
objectives of the agent. A security  method defines a sequence of 
actions and/or services to satisfy an agent’s security mechanisms. 
2.2.1 Protection Objective 
A protection objective indicates a des irable s ecurity attribute 
that an agent m ight have, such as integrity , and availability . An 
agent might impose a security objective by  itself or more likely a 
protection objective is imposed  to an agent through its 
environment (e.g. from a security  policy  or through other 
systems/agents/stakeholders/developers). Moreover, a protection 
objective alters the agent’s m otivational state by  adding 
constraint(s) to the agent with respect to s ecurity. A protection 
objective im poses one or m ore s ecurity cons traints to an agent, 
and each agent might have zero or m ore protection objectives . A 
protection objective is specified as follows: 
[POname],  [POimposer]:=  self | environment 
ProtectionObjective 
name: POname 
imposed_by: POimposer 
Imposed_to: Agent 
constraints:  ˜ SecurityConstraint 
name ≠ ∅  ∧  imposed_to ≠ ∅  ∧  constraints ≠ ∅   
(∀ po: ProtectionObjective) (∀ ag: Agent) (∀ sc: 
SecurityConstraint)  [(sc  po) ∧ (po  ag)] constrain(ag,sc) 
2.2.2 Security Constraint 
A security constraint defines a set of restrictions to the goals and 
the capabilities of the agent. These restrictions are security  related 
and are imposed by the agent’s  environm ent (either from  a 
security polic y, othe r systems/agents, the developers or the 
stakeholders).  
When a s ecurity cons traint res tricts a goal, the agent must 
identify a possible way  of achieving the goal without endanger 
the s ecurity cons traint. On the other hand, when a security 
constraint restricts a capability  (in reality the security  constraint 
will restrict plans and/or events of the capability ) the agent m ust 
identify alternative way s of satis fying its goals without using the 
specific capability.  
It is possible  tha t some  re strictions are communication related. 
For instance, a restriction that might apply for the communication 
of one agent with another agent, might not apply for the 
communication of the same agent with a third agent or vice vers a. 
Also, a security  constraint m ight restrict the goals/capabilities of 
an agent for a s pecific time frame. For instance, a res triction that 
might apply  today  may  not be valid tomorrow. A security  
constraint can be specified as follows: 
[SCname], [SCrestriction] :  Goal | Capability 
[SCtimeFrame]:=  All | Function, [SCcommunication]:=  Agent | All 
SecurityConstraint 
name: SCname 
restricts: SCrestriction 
timeFrame: SCtimeFrame 
constraints:  SCcommunication 
name ≠ ∅  ∧  restricts  ≠ ∅   
(∀ ag: Agent)  [(g: Goal  ag)  (cap: Capability  ag) (sc: 
SecurityConstraint   ag)] restrict(g, sc)  restrict(cap,sc) 
2.2.3 Security Mechanism 
A s ecurity m echanism repres ents a s et of standard security 
methods that an agent might have and they  help towards the 
satisfaction of the protection objectives of the agent.   
The s ecurity m echanism allows  s tructuring the security 
behaviour of an agent with respect  to its security  inform ation. 
Internally, each s ecurity m echanism is  s tructured by  a s et of 
different security  methods, allowing sy stem architects firstly  to 
build up a library  of different security  methods, and secondly to 
build different s ecurity m echanisms for different agents of the 
system, by  adding and removing security  methods from the 
library. Because of this, a s ecurity m echanism could be either 
available or unavailable to an agent at a specific point of time. 
The security mechanism could be structured by  different kind of 
security methods. Some of them  able to detect security  breaches, 
some of them able to prevent security breaches, and some of them 
able to recover from  security breaches. Therefore, the ty pe of a 
security mechanism could be one of the following: (1) detecting: 
which involves only  detection secu rity methods; (2) preventing: 
which involves only  prevention security  methods; (3) recovering:  
which involves only recovery  security  methods;(4) 
combinational: which involves security methods of all types 
A security mechanism is specified as follows: 
[SMname], [SMavailability]:=  Available | Unavailable 
[SMtype]:=  Detecting | Preventing | Recovering | Combinational 
SecurityMechanism 
name: SMname 
composed_of :  ˜  SecurityMethod 
type: SMtype 
availability: SMavailability 
help: ˜ Protection Objective 
name ≠ ∅  ∧  composed_of ≠ ∅  ∧ type  ≠ ∅   
(∀ SM: SecurityMechanism) (∃ ag : Agent ) • use(sm,ag) 
2.2.4 Security Method 
A security method defines a sequen ce of actions and/or services 
such as cry ptographic algorithms and secure protocols used to 
realise the protection objectives  of the agent. Each s ecurity 
method consists of the following: 
1. An entry condition, indicating the factors (such as the 
invocation of specific s ecurity m echanism) that caus e 
the method to be triggered 
2. The security action, which specifies the actions/services 
that the agent needs to pe rform with respond to the 
security method invocation 
3. An end condition that specifies the desirable conditions 
of the security action 
The results report if the s ecurity action has failed or succeeded 
and what the next steps should be (these steps would be 
determined by whether the security action succeeded or failed). A 
security action has succeeded if and only  if the output condition 
corresponds to an end condition. 
 
2.3 The architectural Model 
The architectural model describes the interactions among agents 
that compose the M AS. Configurations are the central concept of 
in architectural design [5] , allowing to define the topology  of a 
MAS. The topology  is defined by  a set of bindings between 
provided and required services.  An agent interacts with its 
environment through an interface com posed of sensors and 
effectors. An effector provides  a s et of s ervices to the 
environment. A sensor require s a s et of s ervices from  the 
environment. A service is an operation performed by an agent that 
interacts by  dialoguing with one or several agents. Finally, the 
whole MAS is  specified with an architecture which is composed 
of a s et of configurations . The concept of architecture allows 
representing agents by  one or more detailed, lower-level 
configuration descriptions.  
Due to lack of s pace, this  s ection only  s pecifies the 
configuration concept. A configur ation is a set of interconnecting 
agent instances. Because there may be m ore than one us e of a 
given agent in a MAS, we distinguish the different instances of 
each agent ty pe that appear in a configuration. To this end, we 
define the ty pe IAgent representing the name given to an agent 
instance that has been instantiated within a configuration:  
[IAgent] 
Instantiating an agent also has the secondary  effect of 
instantiating the s ervices that are defined by  its interface. We 
define provided and required service ins tance ty pe s uch as  
follows: 
[IPservice], [IRservice] 
Once the ins tances have been declared, a configuration is 
specified by  describing the collaborations. The collaborations 
define the topology  of the configuration, showing which agent 
instance participates in which interactions. This is done by  
defining a one-to-many  mapping relation between provided and 
required services. 
[AgentType], [Instance]:= IAgent | IPservice | IRservice 
Configuration 
description: ˜  AgentType 
instance: ˜  Instance 
name ≠ ∅  ∧  invocation ≠ ∅  ∧ context  ≠ ∅   
collaboration: (IAgent X IRservice)          (IAgent X IPservice) 
The configuration separates the descriptions of composite 
structures from  the elem ents in thos e com positions. This  allows 
reasoning about the com position as a whole and changing the 
composition without having to exam ine each of the individual 
components in a system. 
3. Agent Architecture for e-commerce 
system 
E-Media (http://www.isys.ucl.ac.be/skwyrl/emedia) is a ty pical 
business-to-consumer application we have developed using the 
architectural concepts explained in S ection 2. The application 
offers an e-commerce architecture supporting the creation of 
information sources that facilitate the on-line transaction of 
products, services, and payments resulting in an effective and 
efficient interaction among sellers, buyers and intermediaries.  
This section describes how we have applied Secure SKwy RL 
ADL to formally specify architectural aspects, such as interfaces, 
knowledge bases, security  objectiv es, security  m echanisms, and 
plans, of the e-Media system. 
3.1 E-Media 
E-Media provides an on-line interface that allows  cus tomers to 
examine the item s on the E-Media catalogue and place orders. 
Customers can s earch the on-line s tore by  either brows ing the 
catalogue or query ing the item database. An online search engine 
allows customers to search title, author/artist and description 
fields through keywords or full-text search. If an item is not 
available in the catalogue, the customer has the option to order it. 
Moreover, Internet communica tions are supported. All web 
information (e.g., product and cu stomer turnover, and sales 
average) of s trategic im portance is  recorded for monthly or on-
demand statistical analy sis. Based of  this statistical and strategic 
information, the system permanently m anages and adapts  the 
stock, pricing and prom otions policy . For example, for each 
product, the sy stem can decide to  increase or decrease stocks or 
profit margins.  It can als o adapt the cus tomer on-line interface 
with new product promotions.  
Apart from the main functional features of the s ystem, security 
is a very  important factor in the development of the E-Media 
system. Customers need to know that their information remains 
secure and accessible only to intended participants , and als o that 
the risks, such as receiving wrong product because someone 
intercepted and changed the order, as sociated with the online 
purchase are m inimized. Therefore, from  the cus tomer’s point of 
view the main security objectives are confidentiality and integrity. 
Confidentiality guarantees that the inform ation is accessible only 
to authorized entities and inaccessible to others, whereas integrity  
guarantees that information remains unmodified from source 
entity to destination entity.  
On the other hand, the stakeholder of the E-Media sy stem need 
to m ake sure that the sy stem will alway s be available for 
customers to buy , it can confirm  the involvem ent of an entity in 
certain communications, and it can prove the identity of an entity. 
In other words, the main s ecurity objectives  from  the e-m edia’s 
stakeholder point of view are availability , non-repudiation, and 
authentication. Availability  guarantees the accessibility and the 
usability of inform ation and resources to authorized entities, non 
repudiation confirm s the involvem ent of an entity  in certain 
communications, and authentication proves the identity  of an 
entity.   
For both, the customer and the e-media stakeholder actors to 
satisfy their s ecurity objectives , s ome security constraints are 
imposed on their dependencies. Figure 2 models the dependencies 
between the cus tomer, the E-M edia stakeholder and the E-M edia 
system along with the security  c onstraints imposed by  the first 
two actors on the sy stem, using the i* model notation [13]  where 
each node represents an actor (or sy stem com ponent) and each 
link between two actors indicates that one actor depends on the 
other for some goal to be atta ined. A dependency  describes an 
“agreement” (called dependum) be tween two actors: the depender 
and the dependee. The depender is the depending actor, and the 
dependee, the actor who is depended upon. The type of the 
dependency describes the nature of the agreement. Goal 
dependencies represent delegation of responsibility for fulfilling a 
goal; softgoal dependencies are sim ilar to goal dependencies, but 
their fulfilment cannot be defined precisely; task dependencies are 
used in situations where the dependee is required.  
Actors are represented as circles; dependums – goals, softgoals, 
tasks and res ources – are res pectively repres ented as ovals, 
clouds, hexagons and rectangles; dependencies have the form 
depender → dependum → dependee. S ecurity cons traints are 
represented as clouds. 
 
Figure 2: E-Media dependencies 
For the architecture of the e-m edia we have followed the 
structure-in-5 organizational architectural s tyle presented notably 
in [14]. More information about alternative architectural 
selections can be found in [15] . According to the structure-in-5 
style, the organization of the s oftware architecture can be 
considered an aggregate of five s ub-structures [16] . The 
Operational Core , which carries out the basic tasks and 
procedures directly  linked to the production of products and 
services; the Strategic Appex , which m akes executive decis ions 
ensuring that the organization fulfills its m ission in an effective 
way and defines the general strate gy of the organization in its 
environment. 
The Middle Line , which establishes a hierarchy  of authority  
between the Strategic Appex and the Operational Core; the 
Technostructure, which serves the organization by  making the 
work of others more effective, typically by  standardizing work 
processes, outputs and skills; the Support, which provides 
specialized services, at various levels of the hierarchy, outside the 
basic operating workflow.  These sub-structures are realized in the 
case of the e-m edia architecture by  the Store Front , the Back 
Store, the Billing Processor , the Coordinator and the Decision 
Maker, as shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: The E-Media Architecture in Structure-in-5 
The Store Front  interacts with customers and provides them 
with a usable front-end web appli cation for consulting, searching 
and shopping media items. The Back Store constitutes the Support 
component. It manages the product database and communicates to 
the Store Front relevant product in formation. It stores and backs 
up all web information about custom ers, products and sales to be 
able to produce s tatistical inform ation (e.g., analyses, average 
charts and turnover reports). Such kind of information is 
computed either for a predefin ed product (when the Coordinator 
asks it) or on a monthly basis for every  product. Based on this 
monthly statistical information, it provides also the Decision 
Maker with strategic information (e.g., sales increase or decrease, 
performance charts, best sales, and s ales previs ion). The Billing 
Processor handles custom er orders and bills. To this end, it 
provides the customer with on-line shopping cart capabilities. 
It also handles, under the responsibility  of the Coordinator 
component, stock orders to avoid shortages or congestions. 
Finally, it ensures the secure  management of financial 
transactions for the Decis ion Maker. The Coordinator a ssumes 
the central position of the archit ecture. It is responsible to 
implements s trategic decis ions for the Decis ion M aker. It 
supervises and coordinates the activities of the Billing Processor 
(initiating the stock and pricing policy ), the Front Store (adapting 
the front end interface with new prom otions and 
recommendations) and the Back S tore (param eterize s tatistical 
computing) ensuring that the sy stem fulfills its mission in an 
effective way . Finally , the Decision Maker  a ssumes strategic 
roles. It defines the Strategic Behavior (e.g., sales and turnover, 
product visibility, and hits) of the sy stem ensuring that objectives 
and responsibilities delegated to the Billing Processor, 
Coordinator and Back Store are c onsistent with respect to their 
capabilities. 
3.2 Secure Architectural Description 
The architecture described in Figure 3 gives an organizational 
representation of the system-to-be including relevant actors and 
their respective goals, tasks and re source inter-dependencies. This 
model can serve as a basis to understand and discuss the 
assignment of system functionalities but it is not adequate to 
provide a precise specification of the sy stem details. As 
introduced in Section 2, SKwy RL-ADL provides a finite set of 
formal agent-oriented constructors that allow detailing in a form al 
and consistent way the software architecture as  well as  its  agent 
components and their behaviors. 
Due to lack of space, we only  provide a partial s pecification in 
SKwyRL-ADL of the Billing Processor agent. W e illustrate some 
concepts detailed in Section 2 plus other ADL concepts 
introduced in Figure 1. For a com plete SKwyRL-ADL 
specification of E–Media, we refer the reader to [8] . Five aspects 
of this agent com ponent are of concern here: the interface 
representing the interactions in which the agent will participate, 
the knowledge base defining the agent knowledge capacity , the 
protection objectives indicating the desired security  attributes of 
the agent, the s ecurity mechanisms representing a s et of s tandard 
security methods that an agent might have and they help towards 
the satisfaction of the protection objectives  of the agent, and the 
capabilities defining agent behaviors. The partial high-level 
formal description of the Billing Processor is as follows: 
Agent:{Billing-Processor 
Interface 
Effector[provide(shopping_cart)] 
Effector[provide(billing)] 
Effector[provide(stock_orders)] 
Effector[provide(finance_security)] 
Sensor[require(strategic_behavior)] 
Sensor[require(statistical_info)] 
KnowledgeBase: 
Stock_KB  Pricing_Kb 
BP_Customer_KB      Providers_KB 
BP_System_KB Statistical_KB 
Protection Objectives: 
Confidentiality_PO Integrity_PO 
Availability_PO Non_Repudiation_PO 
Authentication_PO AccessControl_PO 
Security mechanisms: 
Encipherment_SM DIgitalSignature_SM 
AccessControl_SM DataIntegirty_SM 
AuthenticationExchange_SM 
TrafficPadding_SM RoutingControl_SM 
Notarization_SM 
Capabilities: 
Shopping_Cart_Management_CP 
Billing_CP  Stock_Management_CP 
Statistic_CP 
} 
The agent interface consists of a number of effectors and sensors 
for the agent. Each effector provides a service to other agents, and 
each s ensor requires  a s ervice provided by  another agent. An 
interaction is then defined by the correspondence between a 
required and a provided service. For exam ple, the Billing 
Processor requires the statistical_info service that the Coordinator 
provides. The specification of the service description is presented 
below. Each provided or required service can be detailed by  
describing the sender agent that initiates the service, a set of 
receiver agents  that interact with  the sender, the reply -with that 
defines the information about wh ich the service expresses an 
interaction, and optionally  a set of parameters that define the 
information required to execute the s ervice. The parameters as 
well as the reply -with inform ation can be represented with a 
belief or a set of terms (e.g., function, constant or variable). 
Service: {Ask(statistical_info) 
sender: Coordinator 
parameters: (tw: TimeWindows), (id: Id_product)  
reply_with:  to: Turnover ∨ sl: Sales 
receiver: Back-Store 
Effect: Add(Statistical_KB, Achieve(statistic(“today”,“on_product”) 
} 
The Billing Processor agent has six KBs. Each of them  is 
specified with a name, a KB_body  and a KB_ty pe. The 
specification of the Statistical_Kb is given below. 
KnowledgeBase: {Statistical_KB  
KB_body:  
statistic_computation(Date,Subject) 
product_turnover(Id_Prod,TimeWindows,Turnover) 
customer_turnover(Id_Card,TimeWindows,Turnover) 
product_sales(Id_Prod,TimeWindows,Sales) 
extrapol_sales(Id_Prod,TimeWindows,setoff Sales)  
KB_type: closed_world } 
The Billing Processor has six (6) protection objectives as shown 
in its description. These protection objectives have been identified 
by the security  analy sis that took place for the e-m edia sy stem 
and partially  presented in section 3.1. Each of the protection 
objectives is specified with a name, information of who imposed 
it to the agent, the agent to which it is im posed to, and the 
constraints that it im poses to the agent. F or exam ple, the 
specification of the Non_Repudiation is as follows:  
Protection Objective: { 
name: Non_Repudiation_PO 
imposed_by: Environment 
imposed_to: Billing_Processor 
constraints: ConfirmInvolvementInTransactions 
    } 
In addition, the Billing Processor has 8 different security 
mechanisms that represent a set of  standard security  methods that 
help towards the satisfaction of the protection objectives of the 
Billing Processor.  Each security m echanism is specified with a 
name, the security  methods it is composed of, a ty pe, its 
availability to the agent, and an indication to which protection 
objective helps . The Notarization s ecurity mechanism 
specification for the Billing Processor agent is as follows: 
Security Mechanism: { 
name: Notarization_SM 
composed_of: third_party_notary 
type: Combinational 
availability: Available 
help: Non_Repudiation 
  }  
A third-party notary that must be trusted by  all participants 
provides notarization m echanisms. The notary  can assure 
integrity, origin, time or destination of data. For exam ple, a 
message that has to be subm itted by  a specific deadline m ay be 
required to bear a tim e stamp from a trusted time service proving 
the time of submission. 
The Billing Processor agent has also som e capabilities. A 
capability is com posed of plans and events that together serve to 
give an agent certain abilities. For exam ple, the Billing Processor 
Statistic_CP capability  is defined as follows. The body  contains 
the plans that the capability  can execute and the events it can post 
to be handled by other plans or it can send to other agents. 
Capability:{Statistic_CP  
CP_body:  
Plan Prov_Turnover_On_Demand 
Plan Prov_Turnover 
Plan Sales_Average 
Plan Stock_Orders 
SendEvent Grade 
SendEvent Best_Sales 
SendEvent Promotion 
} 
The Stock_Order plan of the Billing-Processor will m ake sure 
that the level of stock of each product is permanently higher than 
the minimal quantity , which is determ ined by the coordinator on 
the basis of the strategic orie ntation provided by  the Decision-
Maker. In the plan body , the quantity  to order is determined and 
then the order is sent to the publisher. Eventually , the level of 
stock is updated in the system. In case of plan failure, the ‘fail” 
instructions are carried out. So the billing-Processor searches for 
the last order sent for this product and reorder the same quantity. 
Then the stock level is updated with the quantity ordered.  
Plan:{ 
Name: Stock_Orders 
invoc:   
 Maintain(current_stock(id,Availability > lb) 
// with id: Id_Product  
// From Coordinator.Ask(stock_orders).reply_with 
// with lb: Lower_Bound  
// From Coordinator.Ask(stock_orders).reply_with  
context:  
    current_stock(id,Availability < lb)  
∧ ¬ time (now > “11 am”)  
∧ (day(now =“monday”  
∨ day(now =“wednesday”) 
body: 
    action: proceed_order(id, lb)   
             effect: Add(Stock_Kb, Sent_Orders(id,qu,date))  
endstate:  
Add(Stock_Kb, Sent_Orders(id,qu,date)) 
succeed:  
action: update_stock(id, av) 
    //with av: availability 
effect: Add(Stock_Kb, Stock(id, av)) 
fail:  
action: search_last(sent_orders(),id)  as  qu: Quantity 
   Add(Stock_Kb, Sent_Orders(id,qu,date)) 
  update_stock(id, av) 
effect: Add(Stock_Kb, Stock(id, av)) 
} 
4. E-Media Implementation 
The E-Media application has b een implemented (~ 10.000 lines 
of code) with JACK [17] , a BD I agent-oriented development 
environment for JAVA. The implementation was based on the 
structure-in-5 architecture described in Section 3.1 and the formal 
SKwyRL-ADL specification overv iewed in Section 3.2, We 
briefly describe the E-Media im plementation to illustrate the role 
of the agents and their interactions  as  well as  pres enting s ome 
implementation of the secure architectural cons iderations for the 
payment information. 
When an on-line cus tomer gets  connected to E-m edia, an 
instance of the F ront-Store is  created to display an interface that 
allows the new com ing us er to regis ter. Then, the Back-Store 
handles the information provided by  the user and checks its 
validity. If the access is granted, the user can purchase products 
on E-Media by adding catalogue items to the shopping cart 
managed by the Billing-Processor. At any  time the user can use a 
navigation-bar to switch from one  section of the website to 
another. Moreover, promotions a nd best sales are part of the 
strategic behaviour objective. The prom otions policy  is initiated 
by the Decision-Maker based on the strategic information 
provided by  the Back-Store. The Coordinator chooses the best 
promotions and consequently  adap ts the Store Front lay out. The 
Coordinator acts sim ilarly for the best sales: the Back-Store 
computes the five bes t s ellers and the Coordinator accordingly  
updates the Store-Front. Figure 4 describes the Store-Front 
interface for the DVD section.  
 
Figure 4: Interface of e-media DVD section 
To search the E-Media DVD catalogue, the user must fill at least 
one field of the search engine (1). The Store-Front sends the 
query parameters to the Back Store which provides the results 
back to the Store-Front (2).  
At any moment during the session, the user can click on a 
product (best seller, query  result, and shopping cart); a request is 
then sent to Back Store to provide more information on this 
product (3).  
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